International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology pp. 465-492: Adam Brandenburger
Essential stability in games with infinitely many pure strategies pp. 493-503: Yong-Hui Zhou, Jian Yu and Shu-Wen Xiang
Formation of segregated and integrated groups pp. 505-519: Alison Watts
All in good time pp. 521-538: Aviad Heifetz and Clara Ponsati
The gamma-core and coalition formation pp. 539-556: Parkash Chander
The Shapley value of exact assignment games pp. 557-568: Maike Hoffmann and Peter Sudhölter
A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems pp. 569-590: Diethard Pallaschke and Joachim Rosenmüller
Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games pp. 591-602: Klaus Kultti and Hannu Salonen
Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and the D-core pp. 603-615: Francesc Llerena and Carles Rafels

Rational ignorance and voting behavior pp. 315-335: Cesar Martinelli
On participation games with complete information pp. 337-352: Tasos Kalandrakis
Protests and reputation pp. 353-377: Lucia Buenrostro, Amrita Dhillon and Myrna Wooders
The welfare effects of public opinion polls pp. 379-394: Esteban Klor and Eyal Winter
Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques pp. 395-426: L. Hernández-Lamoneda, Ruben Juarez and F. Sánchez-Sánchez
Monotonicity in asymmetric first-price auctions with affiliation pp. 427-453: David McAdams
Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules pp. 455-464: José Alcantud and Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Government formation in a two dimensional policy space pp. 151-184: Enriqueta Aragones
Stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core pp. 185-204: Anna Bogomolnaia, Michel Breton, Alexey Savvateev and Shlomo Weber
Rationally constructing the dimensions of the political sphere pp. 205-221: Michael Chwe
Endogenous platforms: the case of many parties pp. 223-249: Andrei Gomberg, Francisco Marhuenda and Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín
Communication and bargaining in the spatial model pp. 251-266: Adam Meirowitz
A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria pp. 267-286: Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni
Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule pp. 287-314: Matthias Messner and Mattias K Polborn

The calculus of ethical voting pp. 1-25: Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni
Approval voting: three examples pp. 27-38: Francesco De Sinopoli, Bhaskar Dutta and Jean-François Laslier
Repeated Downsian electoral competition pp. 39-69: John Duggan and Mark Fey
Memetics and voting: how nature may make us public spirited pp. 71-90: John Conley, Ali Toossi and Myrna Wooders
Majority voting leads to unanimity pp. 91-110: Geir Asheim, Carl Claussen and Tore Nilssen
A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems pp. 111-128: Guillermo Owen, Ines Lindner, Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman and Leonard Ray
Naive audience and communication bias pp. 129-150: Marco Ottaviani and Francesco Squintani

Stochastic dominance equilibria in two-person noncooperative games pp. 457-473: Andrés Perea, Hans Peters, Tim Schulteis and Dries Vermeulen
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games pp. 475-493: Michihiro Kandori and Ichiro Obara
Zero-sum state constrained differential games: existence of value for Bolza problem pp. 495-527: Piernicola Bettiol, Pierre Cardaliaguet and Marc Quincampoix
Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games pp. 529-559: Andrés Perea
On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games pp. 561-581: Fabrizio Germano
All-pay auctions with risk-averse players pp. 583-599: Gadi Fibich, Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela

Introduction pp. 303-304: Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Bhaskar Dutta
Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games pp. 305-318: Francis Bloch and Matthew Jackson
Unequal connections pp. 319-349: Sanjeev Goyal and Sumit Joshi
A characterization of stochastically stable networks pp. 351-369: Olivier Tercieux and Vincent Vannetelbosch
Contagion and coordination in random networks pp. 371-381: Dunia López-Pintado
Diffusion and growth in an evolving network pp. 383-397: George Ehrhardt, Matteo Marsili and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Cores of non-atomic market games pp. 399-424: Massimiliano Amarante, Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio
A model of interim information sharing under incomplete information pp. 425-442: Antonio Jimenez-Martinez
Endogenous timing in duopoly: experimental evidence pp. 443-456: Miguel Fonseca, Wieland Müller and Hans-Theo Normann

The Value of Information Structures in Zero-sum Games with Lack of Information on One Side pp. 155-165: Eran Shmaya
Nash equilibria of Cauchy-random zero-sum and coordination matrix games pp. 167-184: David Roberts
The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m-player Game “Shoot Later, Shoot First!” pp. 185-205: Ernst Presman and I. Sonin
Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting pp. 207-228: Ines Macho-Stadler, David Perez-Castrillo and Nicolás Porteiro
An Asymmetric Shapley–Shubik Power Index pp. 229-240: Xingwei Hu
Semi-marginalistic Values for Set Games pp. 241-258: Hao Sun and Theo Driessen
A Simple Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Games pp. 259-272: Rodica Brânzei, Elena Iñarra, Stef Tijs and José Zarzuelo
Downsian Competition When No Policy is Unbeatable pp. 273-284: Jesper Roine
Foregone with the Wind: Indirect Payoff Information and its Implications for Choice pp. 285-302: Brit Grosskopf, Ido Erev and Eldad Yechiam

Median Stable Matching for College Admissions pp. 1-11: Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn
Monotonicity and Consistency in Matching Markets pp. 13-31: Manabu Toda
On Exiting After Voting pp. 33-54: Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
The Weak Sequential Core for Two-Period Economies pp. 55-65: P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski and Andrés Perea
Stakeholder bargaining games pp. 67-77: Paola Manzini and Clara Ponsati
A Note on Multi-Issue Bargaining with a Finite Set of Alternatives pp. 79-90: Younghwan In
The Dvoretzky-Wald-Wolfowitz theorem and purification in atomless finite-action games pp. 91-104: M. Khan, Kali Rath and Yeneng Sun
Probabilistic Choice in Games: Properties of Rosenthal’s t-Solutions pp. 105-121: Mark Voorneveld
Equilibria for Pooling Situations pp. 123-130: G. Koshevoy, S. Tijs and S. Miquel
A Strong Anti-Folk Theorem pp. 131-151: Guilherme Carmona
An Axiomatization of Minimal Curb Sets pp. 153-153: Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets and Henk Norde