International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 43, issue 4, 2014

Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation pp. 721-745

Abhimanyu Khan

Voting power and proportional representation of voters pp. 747-766

Artyom Jelnov and Yair Tauman

Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states pp. 767-789

Fedor Sandomirskiy

Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals pp. 791-819

Ron Lavi and Ella Segev

Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games pp. 821-843

Julio González-Díaz and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

Linking the Kar and folk solutions through a problem separation property pp. 845-870

Christian Trudeau

A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes pp. 871-879

Jesús Getán, Jesús Montes and Carles Rafels

Utility proportional beliefs pp. 881-902

Christian Bach and Andrés Perea

Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play pp. 903-924

Abhimanyu Khan and Ronald Peeters

Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems pp. 925-943

Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon pp. 945-951

János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan and Koos Vrieze

The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification pp. 953-973

Akira Okada

Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies pp. 975-990

Jiuqiang Liu and Xiaodong Liu

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium pp. 991-1008

Zacharias Maniadis

Volume 43, issue 3, 2014

Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders pp. 487-514

Vlad Mares and Jeroen Swinkels

Contests with productive effort pp. 515-523

Ron Siegel

A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs pp. 525-550

Ronald Stauber

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game pp. 551-577

Daniel Carvalho and Luis Santos-Pinto

Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped pp. 579-597

Vikram Manjunath

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives pp. 599-618

Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer

The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare pp. 619-627

Anirban Kar and Arunava Sen

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly pp. 629-658

Rabah Amir and Giuseppe De Feo

On $${\alpha }$$ α -roughly weighted games pp. 659-692

Josep Freixas and Sascha Kurz

Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach pp. 693-719

Naoki Kojima

Volume 43, issue 2, 2014

Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma pp. 245-267

Kfir Eliaz and Roberto Serrano

LIM is not slim pp. 269-281

Alex Fink, Aviezri Fraenkel and Carlos Santos

Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games pp. 283-350

Igal Milchtaich

Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players pp. 351-368

Rene van den Brink, Gerard Laan and Valeri Vasil’ev

Ranking asymmetric auctions pp. 369-393

Arieh Gavious and Yizhaq Minchuk

On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria pp. 395-402

Carlos Pimienta and Jianfei Shen

Monotonic models and cycles pp. 403-413

José Rodrigues-Neto

The combinatorial game theory of well-tempered scoring games pp. 415-438

Will Johnson

The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain pp. 439-454

Eun Jeong Heo

Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games pp. 455-485

Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

Volume 43, issue 1, 2014

Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value pp. 1-11

André Casajus

How long to Pareto efficiency? pp. 13-24

Yakov Babichenko

When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? pp. 25-36

Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper

On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games pp. 37-63

Jean Derks, Hans Peters and Peter Sudhölter

Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox” pp. 65-88

Maria Levati, Matthias Uhl and Ro'i Zultan

Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games pp. 89-135

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi

Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory pp. 137-143

Daniel Monte

A savings paradox for integer-valued gambling strategies pp. 145-151

Jason Teutsch

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model pp. 153-168

Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa

Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games pp. 169-192

Tadeusz Radzik

Countable spaces and common priors pp. 193-213

Ziv Hellman

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire pp. 215-244

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Volume 42, issue 4, 2013

Algorithms for lattice games pp. 777-788

Alan Guo and Ezra Miller

Timing of messages and the Aumann conjecture: a multiple-selves approach pp. 789-800

Ro'i Zultan

Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games pp. 801-833

Marcin Dziubiński

Matching and price competition: beyond symmetric linear costs pp. 835-844

Julio González-Díaz and Ron Siegel

Picking the winners pp. 845-865

Pablo Amoros

Correlation through bounded recall strategies pp. 867-890

Ron Peretz

A polynomial algorithm for a two parameter extension of Wythoff NIM based on the Perron–Frobenius theory pp. 891-915

Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich and Vladimir Oudalov

Optimal strategies for a game on amenable semigroups pp. 917-929

Valerio Capraro and Kent Morrison

Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms pp. 931-946

Inbar Aricha and Rann Smorodinsky

Values of nondifferentiable vector measure games pp. 947-972

Omer Edhan

Stochastic bankruptcy games pp. 973-988

Helga Habis and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Value function of differential games without Isaacs conditions. An approach with nonanticipative mixed strategies pp. 989-1020

Rainer Buckdahn, Juan Li and Marc Quincampoix

Analysis of stochastic matching markets pp. 1021-1040

Péter Biró and Gethin Norman

Imitation, local interaction, and coordination pp. 1041-1057

Hsiao-Chi Chen, Yunshyong Chow and Li-Chau Wu

On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games pp. 1059-1083

Paul Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Sørensen and Carmine Ventre

Representation of finite games as network congestion games pp. 1085-1096

Igal Milchtaich

Volume 42, issue 3, 2013

Introduction to the special issue pp. 563-566

Giacomo Bonanno, Andreas Herzig, Wiebe Hoek and Jérôme Lang

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part I: definition and properties pp. 567-592

Giacomo Bonanno

Bounded rationality, strategy simplification, and equilibrium pp. 593-611

Hubie Chen

Where do preferences come from? pp. 613-637

Franz Dietrich and Christian List

Program equilibrium—a program reasoning approach pp. 639-671

Wiebe Hoek, Cees Witteveen and Michael Wooldridge

Stability and fairness in models with a multiple membership pp. 673-694

Michel Le Breton, Juan Moreno-Ternero, Alexey Savvateev and Shlomo Weber

Wisdom of crowds versus groupthink: learning in groups and in isolation pp. 695-723

Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin Zollman and David Danks

Awareness-dependent subjective expected utility pp. 725-753

Burkhard Schipper

Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces pp. 755-776

Michael Trost

Volume 42, issue 2, 2013

Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem pp. 325-337

J. Arin

On the core: complement-reduced game and max-reduced game pp. 339-355

Yan-An Hwang

On membership and marginal values pp. 357-373

Norman Kleinberg and Jeffrey Weiss

Farsighted free trade networks pp. 375-398

Jin Zhang, Licun Xue and Lei Zu

Almost common priors pp. 399-410

Ziv Hellman

On Dedekind’s problem for complete simple games pp. 411-437

Sascha Kurz and Nikolas Tautenhahn

A discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation pp. 439-460

Eric Bahel and Christian Trudeau

Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property pp. 461-482

Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Rolf Möhring

Contractually stable networks pp. 483-499

Jean-François Caulier, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer–counteroffer mechanism with two players pp. 501-520

Yuan Ju

One-to-many non-cooperative matching games pp. 521-539

Yujiro Kawasaki

Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games pp. 541-562

Indrajit Ray and Sonali Sen Gupta

Volume 42, issue 1, 2013

Three hierarchies of simple games parameterized by “resource” parameters pp. 1-17

Tatiana Gvozdeva, Lane Hemaspaandra and Arkadii Slinko

An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm pp. 19-28

Thayer Morrill

Strategic cooperation in cost sharing games pp. 29-53

Martin Hoefer

Common learning with intertemporal dependence pp. 55-98

Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson

Trimmed equilibrium pp. 99-114

Valeska Groenert

Coalitional unanimity versus strategy-proofness in coalition formation problems pp. 115-130

Koji Takamiya

Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines pp. 131-163

Conan Mukherjee

The equivalence of linear programs and zero-sum games pp. 165-177

Ilan Adler

Co-evolutionary dynamics and Bayesian interaction games pp. 179-210

Mathias Staudigl

On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks pp. 211-237

Tim Hellmann

Cooperative Markov decision processes: time consistency, greedy players satisfaction, and cooperation maintenance pp. 239-262

Konstantin Avrachenkov, Laura Cottatellucci and Lorenzo Maggi

Disagreement and evidence production in strategic information transmission pp. 263-282

Peter Eso and Ádám Galambos

Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games pp. 283-294

Markus Kinateder

On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting pp. 295-303

Bo Chen and Satoru Fujishige

“Procedural” values for cooperative games pp. 305-324

Marcin Malawski