International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2026

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 45, issue 4, 2016

Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games pp. 769-793

Adib Bagh

Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs’ condition pp. 795-816

Rainer Buckdahn, Marc Quincampoix, Catherine Rainer and Yuhong Xu

Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities pp. 817-838

Dominik Karos

Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information pp. 839-857

Ori Haimanko and Atsushi Kajii

Building Nim pp. 859-873

Eric Duchêne, Matthieu Dufour, Silvia Heubach and Urban Larsson

Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems pp. 875-892

Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch

Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem pp. 893-931

Kei Kawakami

First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules pp. 933-970

Bradley Ruffle and Oscar Volij

Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games pp. 971-984

Juan I. Block and David Levine

Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games pp. 985-1011

Maxwell Pak and Bing Xu

A monotonic core solution for convex TU games pp. 1013-1029

J. Arin and I. Katsev

Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids pp. 1031-1052

Patrick Hummel, Randolph McAfee and Sergei Vassilvitskii

Reduced games and egalitarian solutions pp. 1053-1069

Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium pp. 1071-1094

Giacomo Bonanno

Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy pp. 1095-1109

Jiuqiang Liu and Huihui Zhang

Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 subgames pp. 1111-1131

Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino and Vladimir Oudalov

Equilibria and centrality in link formation games pp. 1133-1151

Hannu Salonen

Volume 45, issue 3, 2016

Strategic complementarities, network games and endogenous network formation pp. 497-509

Andreas Lagerås and David Seim

The problem of approach in differential–difference games pp. 511-522

Ievgen Liubarshchuk and Ingo Althöfer

On refinements of subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium pp. 523-542

János Flesch and Arkadi Predtetchinski

On the core and bargaining set of a veto game pp. 543-566

Eric Bahel

On discounted AR–AT semi-Markov games and its complementarity formulations pp. 567-583

P. Mondal, S. Sinha, S. K. Neogy and A. K. Das

Axiomatizing core extensions on NTU games pp. 585-600

R. Pablo Arribillaga

Absence-proofness: Group stability beyond the core pp. 601-616

Emre Doğan

Grundy values of Fibonacci nim pp. 617-625

Urban Larsson and Simon Rubinstein-Salzedo

Dynamic learning and strategic communication pp. 627-653

Maxim Ivanov

An equilibrium analysis of the probabilistic serial mechanism pp. 655-674

Özgün Ekici and Onur Kesten

Measurability of the value of a parametrized game pp. 675-683

Karel Prikry and William D. Sudderth

Pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games: characterization and existence pp. 685-697

Haifeng Fu, Ying Xu and Luyi Zhang

Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem pp. 699-708

Youngsub Chun, Nari Park and Duygu Yengin

Symmetry and approximate equilibria in games with countably many players pp. 709-717

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Pure strategy equilibrium in finite weakly unilaterally competitive games pp. 719-729

Takuya Iimura and Takahiro Watanabe

Misère-play Hackenbush Sprigs pp. 731-742

Neil A. McKay, Rebecca Milley and Richard J. Nowakowski

Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept pp. 743-768

Marilda Sotomayor

Volume 45, issue 1, 2016

Special issue in honor of Abraham Neyman pp. 3-9

Olivier Gossner, Ori Haimanko and Eilon Solan

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games pp. 11-36

Francoise Forges, Ulrich Horst and Antoine Salomon

Allocation games with caps: from Captain Lotto to all-pay auctions pp. 37-61

Sergiu Hart

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps pp. 63-88

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach and Aner Sela

Dynamic moral hazard without commitment pp. 89-136

Johannes Hörner and Larry Samuelson

Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals pp. 137-153

John Hillas and Min Liu

Recursive games: uniform value, Tauberian theorem and the Mertens conjecture “ $$Maxmin=\lim v_n=\lim v_{\uplambda }$$ M a x m i n = lim v n = lim v λ ” pp. 155-189

Xiaoxi Li and Xavier Venel

The challenge of non-zero-sum stochastic games pp. 191-204

Robert Samuel Simon

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state pp. 205-237

J. Kuipers, J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers and K. Vrieze

Eliciting performance: deterministic versus proportional prizes pp. 239-267

Pradeep Dubey and Siddhartha Sahi

Characterizations of solutions for games with precedence constraints pp. 269-290

Michel Grabisch and Peter Sudhölter

Imitation dynamics with payoff shocks pp. 291-320

Panayotis Mertikopoulos and Yannick Viossat

Continuous-time limit of dynamic games with incomplete information and a more informed player pp. 321-352

Fabien Gensbittel

General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games pp. 353-374

Bruno Ziliotto

On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information pp. 375-387

Dov Samet

Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying stage duration pp. 389-410

Sylvain Sorin and Guillaume Vigeral

Values of vector measure market games and their representations pp. 411-433

Omer Edhan

Projections and functions of Nash equilibria pp. 435-459

Yehuda Levy

The complexity of interacting automata pp. 461-496

Olivier Gossner, Penelope Hernandez and Ron Peretz