The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification

Akira Okada

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 953-973

Abstract: We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of “central” players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal contributions of players to the grand coalition play a critical role in their expected equilibrium payoffs. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Non-cooperative bargaining; Coalitional game; Three-person game; Random proposer; Core; Marginal contribution; C71; C72; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:953-973

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0413-2

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