Non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games

Marcin Dziubiński ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 4, 833 pages

Abstract: We study a non-symmetric variant of General Lotto games introduced in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008 ). We provide a complete characterization of optimal strategies for both players in non-symmetric discrete General Lotto games, where one of the players has an advantage over the other. By this we complete the characterization given in Hart (Int J Game Theory 36:441–460, 2008 ), where the strategies for symmetric case were fully characterized and some of the optimal strategies for the non-symmetric case were obtained. We find a group of completely new atomic strategies, which are used as building components for the optimal strategies. Our results are applicable to discrete variants of all-pay auctions. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Keywords: General Lotto; Allocation games; All-pay auctions; C72; C02; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0324-z

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