Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon

János Flesch (), Jeroen Kuipers (), Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi (), Gijs Schoenmakers (), Eran Shmaya (), Eilon Solan () and Koos Vrieze ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 945-951

Abstract: Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel measurable payoffs, by providing a counter-example. We also consider a refinement called strong subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium, and show by means of another counter-example, with a simpler structure than the previous one, that a game may have no strong subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium for sufficiently small $$\varepsilon >0$$ ε > 0 , even though it admits a subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium for every $$\varepsilon >0$$ ε > 0 . Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Subgame-perfect equilibrium; Perfect-information games; Infinite horizon; Non-existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-014-0412-3

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