Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games

Indrajit Ray () and Sonali Sen Gupta

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 2, 562 pages

Abstract: For duopoly models, we analyse the concept of coarse correlated equilibrium using simple symmetric devices that the players choose to commit to in equilibrium. In a linear duopoly game, we prove that Nash-centric devices, involving a sunspot structure, are simple symmetric coarse correlated equilibria. Any small unilateral perturbation from such a structure fails to be an equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Duopoly; Coarse correlation; Simple devices; Sunspots; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0360-8

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