Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped

Vikram Manjunath ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 3, 579-597

Abstract: We study the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single-dipped preferences. We ask whether there are unanimous and strategy-proof rules for this model. The answer is positive and we characterize all such rules. We generalize our model to allow the set of alternatives to be unbounded. If the set of alternatives does not have a maximal and a minimal element, there is no meaningful notion of efficiency. However, we show that the range of every strategy-proof rule has a maximal and a minimal element. We then characterize all strategy-proof rules. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Single-dipped preferences; Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0396-4

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