International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Limit Properties of Power Indices in a Class of Representative Systems pp. 361-88: S Muto
The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games pp. 389-407: M Maschler and G Owen
Incentive Compatible Strategies for General Stackelberg Games with Incomplete Information pp. 409-21: Frank Page
Non-cooperative Matching Games pp. 423-31: Ulrich Kamecke
Homogeneous Games as Anti Step Functions pp. 433-69: P Sudholter
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] pp. 471-76: Benny Moldovanu

Nonconvexity in Noncooperative Game Theory pp. 247-59: M M Kostreva
A Note on Polymatrix Games pp. 261-72: Luis Quintas
A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games pp. 273-91: Robert Rosenthal
On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States pp. 293-310: O J Vrieze and F Thuijsman
A Note on Periodicity in Some Octal Games pp. 311-20: A Gangolli and T Plambeck
Weighted Majority Games Have Many u-Values pp. 321-25: D Monderer
Geodetic Contraction Games on Graphs pp. 327-38: A S Fraenkel and F Harary
Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space pp. 339-56: G Owen and Lloyd Shapley

The Space of Conditional Systems is a Ball pp. 125-39: Andrew McLennan
Consistent Conditional Systems in Noncooperative Game Theory pp. 141-74: Andrew McLennan
Fixed Points of Contractible Valued Correspondences pp. 175-84: Andrew McLennan
Credible Coalitions and the Core pp. 185-87: Debraj Ray
Existence of Stationary Equilibrium Strategies in Non-zero Sum Discounted Stochastic Games with Uncountable State Space and State-Independent Transitions pp. 189-94: T Parthasarathy and S Sinha
Regular Simple Games pp. 195-207: Ezra Einy and Ehud Lehrer
Information Market Games pp. 209-26: Shigeo Muto, Jos Potters and Stef Tijs
A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation pp. 227-40: Eyal Winter

On Stochastic Games with Lack of Information on One Side pp. 1-29: C Melolidakis
Reduction of Silverman-Like Games to Games on Bounded Sets pp. 31-36: G A Heuer
A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games pp. 37-44: E M Bolger
On Repeated Games without a Recursive Structure: Existence of Lim Vn pp. 45-55: Sylvain Sorin
Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions pp. 57-89: Ehud Lehrer
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for l-Stability of Games in Constitutional Form pp. 91-110: N G Andjiga and J Moulen
A Note on Balancedness and Nonemptiness of the Core in Voting Games pp. 111-17: Michel Le Breton

Games with Informants: An Information-Theoretical Approach towards a Game-Theoretical Problem pp. 245-78: Hans-Martin Wallmeier
Bargaining in Cooperative Games pp. 279-300: Elaine Bennett and William Zame
Values and Semivalues on Subspaces of Finite Games pp. 301-10: Dov Monderer
A Note on the von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] pp. 311-14: Chih Chang

Nim Games with Arbitrary Periodic Moving Orders pp. 165-75: Ingo Althofer
A Note on Reactive Equilibria in the Discounted Prisoner's Dilemma and Associated Games pp. 177-86: Ehud Kalai, Dov Samet and William Stanford
A Note on Tight Extensive Game Forms pp. 187-91: Van W Kolpin
A Note on Aspirations in Non-transferable Utility Games pp. 193-200: Immanuel Bomze
Games with Convex Payoff Function in the First Variable pp. 201-04: E Gomez
Refinements of the B-Core and the Strong Equilibrium and the Aumann Proposition pp. 205-24: Subir K Chakrabarti
Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination pp. 225-39: Akira Okada

An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value pp. 89-99: Ehud Lehrer
The Manipulability of the Shapley-Value pp. 101-27: William Thomson
Deception Games pp. 129-34: V J Baston and F A Bostock
Neutral Veto Correspondences with a Continuum of Alternatives pp. 135-64: Joseph Abdou

The Shapley Value in the Non Differentiable Case pp. 1-65: Jean-François Mertens
The Linearizing Projection, Global Theories pp. 67-87: W H Ruckle

Individual and Collective Opportunities pp. 245-52: William Thomson
Discrete Hamstrung Squad Car Games pp. 253-61: V J D Baston and F A Bostock
Sub-core Solutions of the Problem of Strong Implementation pp. 263-89: R Holzman
On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse: A Correction pp. 290: Bezalel Peleg
Single-Suit Two-Person Card Play pp. 291-320: J Kahn, J C Lagarias and H S Witsenhausen
Achievement and Avoidance Games for Generating Abelian Groups pp. 321-25: M Anderson and F Harary