International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 46, issue 4, 2017

The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set pp. 891-918

Lukáš Adam and Tomáš Kroupa

Generalized additive games pp. 919-939

Giulia Cesari, Roberto Lucchetti and Stefano Moretti

Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with a continuum of agents pp. 941-955

Jiuqiang Liu

Unit-sphere games pp. 957-974

Pingzhong Tang and Hanrui Zhang

Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot–Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part pp. 975-990

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal

Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak pp. 991-1014

Wonki Cho and Battal Dogan

Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies pp. 1015-1036

Michele Lombardi and Naoki Yoshihara

Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring pp. 1037-1069

Heng Liu

Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice pp. 1071-1088

Takashi Shimizu

From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure pp. 1089-1113

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, R. Brink, G. Laan and Oriol Tejada

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution pp. 1115-1135

Bram Driesen, Peter Eccles and Nora Wegner

On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets pp. 1137-1161

David Perez-Castrillo and Marilda Sotomayor

Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game pp. 1163-1191

Edward Cartwright and Anna Stepanova

Volume 46, issue 3, 2017

Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria pp. 595-629

Fabrizio Germano and Peio Zuazo-Garin

Weighted values and the core in NTU games pp. 631-654

Koji Yokote

Flow auctions pp. 655-665

Ilan Kremer, Zvi Wiener and Eyal Winter

Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information pp. 667-692

Sergiu Ungureanu

Preselection and expert advice pp. 693-714

Elisabeth Schulte and Mike Felgenhauer

The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game pp. 715-736

Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki

Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation pp. 737-760

Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui and Lorenzo Rocco

Stationary, completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games pp. 761-782

Sujatha Babu, Nagarajan Krishnamurthy and T. Parthasarathy

Mechanism design for land acquisition pp. 783-812

Soumendu Sarkar

Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning pp. 813-850

Vladimir Karamychev and Bauke Visser

Coordination games on graphs pp. 851-877

Krzysztof R. Apt, Bart Keijzer, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer and Sunil Simon

Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints pp. 879-890

Azar Abizada

Volume 46, issue 2, 2017

Scarcity, competition, and value pp. 295-310

André Casajus and Harald Wiese

Characterizations of perfect recall pp. 311-326

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation pp. 327-355

Karl Jandoc and Ruben Juarez

Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition pp. 357-381

Dimitrios Xefteris, Didier Laussel and Michel Le Breton

A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts pp. 383-433

Jian Yang

Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities pp. 435-455

Mehmet Karakaya and Bettina Klaus

Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality pp. 457-473

Joseph Halpern and Yoram Moses

On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs pp. 475-486

Michał Król

Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems pp. 487-509

Jaeok Park

Strategic risk and response time across games pp. 511-523

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Debrah Meloso and Luis Miller

An axiomatic characterization of the Owen–Shapley spatial power index pp. 525-545

Hans Peters and José M. Zarzuelo

P-positions in modular extensions to Nim pp. 547-561

Tanya Khovanova and Karan Sarkar

On the drawbacks of large committees pp. 563-582

Volker Hahn

The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity pp. 583-589

Jonathan Newton

Erratum to: A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium pp. 591-594

Joseph Halpern

Volume 46, issue 1, 2017

Uncertainty in the traveler’s dilemma pp. 1-12

Gilad Bavly

Essential stability of $$\alpha $$ α -core pp. 13-28

Zhe Yang

Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty pp. 29-49

Emiliya Lazarova and Dinko Dimitrov

Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities pp. 51-78

Thomas Gall

Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information pp. 79-102

Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach and Aner Sela

Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems pp. 103-124

Ayşe Yazıcı

House exchange and residential segregation in networks pp. 125-147

Zhiwei Cui and Yan-An Hwang

The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency pp. 149-166

Toshiyuki Hirai

Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result pp. 167-183

M. Khan and Yongchao Zhang

A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel pp. 185-204

Chih Chang and Cheng-Cheng Hu

A decomposition for the space of games with externalities pp. 205-233

Joss Sánchez-Pérez

Dynamic price dispersion in Bertrand–Edgeworth competition pp. 235-261

Ching-jen Sun

A nested family of $$\varvec{k}$$ k -total effective rewards for positional games pp. 263-293

Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich and Kazuhisa Makino