Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach

V. N. Kolokoltsov () and O. A. Malafeyev
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V. N. Kolokoltsov: University of Warwick
O. A. Malafeyev: St. Petersburg State University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 3, No 13, 977-999

Abstract: Abstract Recently developed toy models for the mean-field games of corruption and botnet defence in cyber-security with three or four states of agents are extended to a more general mean-field-game model with 2d states, $$d\in \mathbf {N}$$ d ∈ N . In order to tackle new technical difficulties arising from a larger state-space we introduce new asymptotic regimes, namely small discount and small interaction asymptotics. Moreover, the link between stationary and time-dependent solutions is established rigorously leading to a performance of the turnpike theory in a mean-field-game setting.

Keywords: Mean-field game; Stable equilibrium; Turnpike; Botnet defense; Cyber-security; Corruption; Inspection; Social norms; Disease spreading; 91A06; 91A15; 91A40; 91F99 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0614-1

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