Proportional rules for state contingent claims

Sinan Ertemel and Rajnish Kumar
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Rajnish Kumar: Queen’s University Belfast

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 1, No 9, 229-246

Abstract: Abstract We consider rationing problems where the claims are state contingent. Before the state is realized individuals submit claims for every possible state of the world. A rule distributes resources before the realization of the state of the world. We introduce two natural extensions of the proportional rule in this framework, namely, the ex-ante proportional rule and the ex-post proportional rule, and then we characterize them using standard axioms from the literature.

Keywords: Rationing; Proportional rule; State contingent claims; No advantageous reallocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0585-7

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