A q-player impartial avoidance game for generating finite groups
Bret J. Benesh () and
Marisa R. Gaetz ()
Additional contact information
Bret J. Benesh: College of Saint Benedict, Saint John’s University
Marisa R. Gaetz: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 2, No 4, 461 pages
Abstract:
Abstract We study a q-player variation of the impartial avoidance game introduced by Anderson and Harary, where q is a prime. The game is played by the q players taking turns selecting previously-unselected elements of a finite group. The losing player is the one who selects an element that causes the set of jointly-selected elements to be a generating set for the group, with the previous player winning. We introduce a ranking system for the other players to prevent coalitions. We describe the winning strategy for these games on cyclic, nilpotent, dihedral, and dicyclic groups.
Keywords: Group theory; Game theory; Impartial game; Maximal subgroup; 91A46; 20D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-018-0624-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0624-z
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0624-z
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().