All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
Tracy Liu ()
International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 1, 247-271
Abstract Using a controlled laboratory experiment, we examine individuals’ bid timing decisions in complete information all-pay auctions and find that homogeneous bidders are more likely to enter the early bidding stage under a favor-early tie-breaking rule. Furthermore, revenue in an endogenous-entry treatment, in which both sequential and simultaneous all-pay auctions exist, is either lower than or equal to that in an exogenous-entry treatment with only simultaneous all-pay auctions. Additionally, in simultaneous all-pay auctions, individuals do not always employ a mixed strategy as predicted by the risk-neutral model. Instead, our data is better rationalized by a risk- and loss-aversion model.
Keywords: All-pay auction; Bid timing; Experiment; Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium; C7; C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-017-0586-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0586-6
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().