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A generalization of the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions

Dominik Karos (), Nozomu Muto () and Shiran Rachmilevitch ()
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Dominik Karos: Maastricht University
Nozomu Muto: Yokohama National University
Shiran Rachmilevitch: University of Haifa

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 4, 1169-1182

Abstract: Abstract We characterize the class of weakly efficient n-person bargaining solutions that solely depend on the ratios of the players’ ideal payoffs. In the case of at least three players the ratio between the solution payoffs of any two players is a power of the ratio between their ideal payoffs. As special cases this class contains the Egalitarian and the Kalai–Smorodinsky bargaining solutions, which can be pinned down by imposing additional axioms.

Keywords: Bargaining; Efficiency-free characterizations; Parametrized solutions; C71; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0611-4