Economics at your fingertips  

Equal treatment without large numbers

Camelia Bejan () and Juan Camilo Gómez ()
Additional contact information
Camelia Bejan: University of Washington, Bothell
Juan Camilo Gómez: University of Washington, Bothell

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 4, No 11, 1239-1259

Abstract: Abstract We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which core allocations of arbitrary TU-games treat substitute players equally. The core satisfies the equal treatment property if and only if no player needs the participation of all of her substitutes to attain her core payoffs. We show how, without the requirement of a large number of players, this condition generalizes and unifies other sufficient conditions proposed in the literature (in the context of large games and economies) and it helps derive new results for particular classes of games.

Keywords: Equal treatment property; Core; Replica games; Core extensions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0617-y

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

Page updated 2020-04-23
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-018-0617-y