The price of anarchy and stability in general noisy best-response dynamics

Paolo Penna ()
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Paolo Penna: ETH Zurich

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 3, No 6, 839-855

Abstract: Abstract Logit-response dynamics (Alós-Ferrer and Netzer in Games Econ Behav 68(2):413–427, 2010) are a rich and natural class of noisy best-response dynamics. In this work we revise the price of anarchy and the price of stability by considering the quality of long-run equilibria in these dynamics. Our results show that prior studies on simpler dynamics of this type can strongly depend on a sequential schedule of the players’ moves. In particular, a small noise by itself is not enough to improve the quality of equilibria as soon as other very natural schedules are used.

Keywords: Logit-response dynamics; Stochastic stability; Equilibrium selection; Distributed dynamics; Potential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0601-y

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