Asymmetric voluntary cooperation: a repeated sequential best-shot experiment

Lisa Bruttel and Werner Güth
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Werner Güth: LUISS (Rome)

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 3, No 8, 873-891

Abstract: Abstract This paper tests the robustness of voluntary cooperation in a sequential best shot game, a public good game in which the maximal contribution determines the level of public good provision. Thus, efficiency enhancing voluntary cooperation requires asymmetric behavior whose coordination is more difficult. Nevertheless, we find robust cooperation irrespective of treatment-specific institutional obstacles. To explain this finding, we distinguish three behavioral patterns aiming at both, voluntary cooperation and (immediate) payoff equality.

Keywords: Best shot game; Coordination; Transfer; Refund; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C73 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-0633-y

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