A Shapley value representation of network potentials

Satoshi Nakada ()
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Satoshi Nakada: Hitotsubashi University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 4, No 6, 1157 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider network formation games by Jackson and Wolinsky (J Econ Theory 71:44–74, 1996) and characterize the class of games that have a network potential. We show that there exists a network potential if and only if each player’s payoff function can be represented as the Shapley value of a special class of cooperative games indexed by the networks. We also show that a network potential coincides with a potential of the same class of cooperative games.

Keywords: Network potentials; Interaction network potentials; Network formation; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0605-7

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