The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games

Josep Maria Izquierdo () and Carles Rafels
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Josep Maria Izquierdo: Universitat de Barcelona
Carles Rafels: Universitat de Barcelona

International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, issue 1, No 2, 35-54

Abstract: Abstract Within the class of zero-monotonic and grand coalition superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modified Zhou bargaining set à la Shimomura.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Convex games; Core; Bargaining set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8

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