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Common learning with intertemporal dependence

Martin Cripps, Jeffrey Ely, George Mailath () and Larry Samuelson ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 1, 55-98

Abstract: Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing a sequence of private signals. Will the agents commonly learn the value of the parameter, i.e., will the true value of the parameter become approximate common-knowledge? If the signals are independent and identically distributed across time (but not necessarily across agents), the answer is yes (Cripps et al., Econometrica, 76(4):909–933, 2008 ). This paper explores the implications of allowing the signals to be dependent over time. We present a counterexample showing that even extremely simple time dependence can preclude common learning, and present sufficient conditions for common learning. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Common learning; Common belief; Private signals; Private beliefs; D82; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence (2011) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-011-0313-7

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