A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

Kentaro Hatsumi (), Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 1, 153-168

Abstract: Following “Barberà et al. ( 1991 , Econometrica 59:595–609)”, we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Social choice; Mechanism design; Voting by committees; Generalized median voter scheme; Separable preference; C72; D71; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6

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