A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model
Dolors Berga and
Shigehiro Serizawa ()
ISER Discussion Paper from Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
Following Barbera, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991, Econometrica 59, 595-609), we study rules (or social choice functions) through which agents select a subset from a set of objects. We investigate domains on which there exist nontrivial strategy-proof rules. We establish that the set of separable preferences is a maximal domain for the existence of rules satisfying strategy-proofness and no-vetoer.
Date: 2011-03, Revised 2013-02
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Journal Article: A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0809
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