Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma

Kfir Eliaz () and Roberto Serrano

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 2, 245-267

Abstract: Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners’ dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner’s only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner’s best equilibria. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Information disclosure; Generalized prisoners’ dilemma; Uninformative equilibria; Partially or fully informative equilibria; C72; D82; D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma (2010)
Working Paper: Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:245-267

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0374-x

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