Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma

Kfir Eliaz () and Roberto Serrano
Additional contact information
Kfir Eliaz: Brown University

No 2010-20, Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales

Abstract: Consider the problem of information disclosure for a planner who faces two agents interacting in a state-dependent multi-action prisoners' dilemma. We find conditions under which the planner can make use of his superior information by disclosing some of it to the agents, and conditions under which such information leakage is not possible. Although the problem is entirely symmetric, the planner's only way to reveal part of the information is based on creating asymmetries between the two agents by giving them different pieces of information. We also find conditions under which such partially informative equilibria are the planner's best equilibria.

Keywords: Information disclosure; generalized prisoners' dilemma; uninformative equilibria; partially or fully informative equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2010-20.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to repec.imdea.org:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma (2014)
Working Paper: Sending Information to Interactive Receivers Playing a Generalized Prisoners Dilemma (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2010-20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by IMDEA RePEc Maintainer ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).