Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games

Markus Kinateder

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 1, 283-294

Abstract: Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player’s action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to this setup. As is shown for an example, for a range of discount factors, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced under certain conditions and efficiency improves when the players take into account private information. This model applies to many situations in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players’ reaction. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Repeated game; Delayed perfect monitoring; Folk theorem; C72; C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Delayed Perfect Monitoring in Repeated Games (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:283-294

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().