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On Exiting After Voting

Dolors Berga, Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, vol. 34, issue 1, 33-54

Keywords: Voting; Exit; Subgame perfect equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2

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International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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