A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems

Guillermo Owen (), Ines Lindner (), Scott Feld, Bernard Grofman and Leonard Ray

International Journal of Game Theory, 2006, vol. 35, issue 1, 128 pages

Keywords: Voting; Game theory; Market values; Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0055-0

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