Population monotonicity in fair division of multiple indivisible goods

Emre Doğan ()
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Emre Doğan: National Research University Higher School of Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 2, No 2, 376 pages

Abstract: Abstract We consider the fair division of a set of indivisible goods where each agent can receive more than one good, and monetary transfers are allowed. We show that if there are at least three goods to allocate, no efficient solution is population monotonic (PM) on the superadditive Cartesian product preference domain, and the Shapley solution is not PM even on the submodular domain. Moreover, the incompatibility between efficiency and PM prevails in the case of at least four goods on the subadditive Cartesian product domain. We also show that in case there are only two goods to allocate, the Shapley solution and the constrained egalitarian solution are PM on the subadditive preference domain but not on the full preference domain. For the two-good case, we provide a new tool (the hybrid solutions) to construct efficient solutions that are PM on the entire monotone preference domain. The hybrid Shapley solution and the hybrid constrained egalitarian solution are two important examples of such solutions.

Keywords: Population monotonicity; Fair division; Indivisible goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00749-7

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