Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
Chiara Donnini () and
Marialaura Pesce
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Chiara Donnini: Università degli Studi di Napoli Parthenope
International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 4, No 12, 1033-1052
Abstract:
Abstract In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations.
Keywords: Fairness; Fuzzy coalitions; Equal-income Walrasian allocations; Mixed markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:4:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00780-2
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00780-2
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