Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 2, No 1, 360 pages

Abstract: Abstract The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann’s (J Math Econ 1:67–96, 1974, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 ) correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces, and with payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and, in general, not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Stinchcombe’s (J Econ Theory 146:638–655, 2011b, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.12.006 ) extension of Aumann’s (J Math Econ 1:67–96, 1974, https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8 ) solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition.

Keywords: Infinite games of incomplete information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Communication equilibrium; Correlated equilibrium; Strategic approximation of an infinite game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00744-y

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