Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann’s [3] correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces and payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and in general not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Another extension of Aumann’s [3] solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition.

Keywords: infinite games of incomplete information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; strategic approximation of an infinite game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2017-02-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201702

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