Equilibria in Infinite Games of Incomplete Information
Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics
The notion of communication equilibrium extends Aumann’s  correlated equilibrium concept for complete information games to the case of incomplete information. This paper shows that this solution concept has the following property: for the class of incomplete information games with compact metric type and action spaces and payoff functions jointly measurable and continuous in actions, limits of Bayes-Nash equilibria of finite approximations to an infinite game are communication equilibria (and in general not Bayes-Nash equilibria) of the limit game. Another extension of Aumann’s  solution concept to the case of incomplete information fails to satisfy this condition.
Keywords: infinite games of incomplete information; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; communication equilibrium; correlated equilibrium; strategic approximation of an infinite game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rut:rutres:201702
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Departmental Working Papers from Rutgers University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().