EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu (), María Gómez-Rúa and Elena Molis
Additional contact information
Jorge Alcalde-Unzu: Public University of Navarre

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 1, No 10, 185-214

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of cleaning a transboundary river, proposed by Ni and Wang (Games Econ Behav 60:176–186, 2007). A river is modeled as a segment divided into subsegments, each occupied by one region, from upstream to downstream. The waste is transferred from one region to the next at some rate. Since this transfer rate may be unknown, the social planner could have uncertainty over each region’s responsibility. Two natural candidates to distribute the costs in this setting would be the method that assigns to each region its expected responsibility and the one that assigns to each region its median responsibility. We show that the latter is equivalent to the Upstream Responsibility method (Alcalde-Unzu et al. in Games Econ Behav 90:134–150, 2015) and the former is a new method that we call Expected Responsibility. We compare both solutions and analyze them in terms of a new property of monotonicity.

Keywords: Cost allocation; Waste river; Expected responsibility; Median responsibility; Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D61 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-020-00746-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00746-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00746-w

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-020-00746-w