Cooperative games with partial information

Daniel Li Li and Erfang Shan ()
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Daniel Li Li: Shanghai Business School
Erfang Shan: Shanghai University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 1, No 14, 297-309

Abstract: Abstract Let (N, v) be a cooperative game with transferable utility and $$F\subseteq 2^N$$ F ⊆ 2 N an arbitrary set system, where F represents the set of feasible coalitions S whose worths v(S) are known. We introduce a game $$(N,v_F)$$ ( N , v F ) as follows. If $$S\in F$$ S ∈ F , then $$v_F(S)=v(S)$$ v F ( S ) = v ( S ) and otherwise $$v_F(S)$$ v F ( S ) is defined such that S has zero Harsanyi dividend. By taking different F, this model produces some well-known games directly or indirectly, such as hypergraph games. We characterize the Shapley value of $$(N,v_F)$$ ( N , v F ) on different domains similarly to that for the Myerson value.

Keywords: TU game; Partial information; Harsanyi dividend; Characterization; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00759-z

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