Bargaining Sets with Small Coalitions

Ulla Schjodt and Birgitte Sloth ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, vol. 23, issue 1, 49-55

Abstract: We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies; the local bargaining by MasColell (1989) and the global bargaining set by Vind (1992) We alter these definitions to limit the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the global bargaining set is unaltered.

Date: 1994
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Working Paper: Bargaining Sets with Small Coalitions (1990)
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