On Nash Equilibrium Solutions in Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games with Complete Information

Heinz-Uwe Kuenle

International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, vol. 23, issue 4, 303-24

Abstract: Two-person nonzero-sum stochastic games with complete information are considered. It is shown that it is sufficient to search the equilibrium solutions in a class of deterministic strategy pairs--the so-called intimidation strategy pairs. Furthermore, properties of the set of all equilibrium losses of such strategy pairs are proved.

Date: 1994
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