Extension of the Perles-Maschler Solution to N-Person Bargaining Games

Emilio Calvo Ramón () and Esther Gutierrez

International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, vol. 23, issue 4, 325-46

Abstract: The superadditive solution for 2-person Nash bargaining games was axiomatically defined in Perles/Maschler (1981). In Perles (1982) it was shown that the axioms are incompatible even for 3-person bargaining games. In this paper we offer a generalization method of this solution concept for n-person games. In this method, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution (1975) is revealed as the rule followed to determine the movements along the path of intermediate agreements.

Date: 1994
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