Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games

Geoffroy de Clippel, Hans Peters and Horst Zank ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 33, issue 1, 145-158

Abstract: The validity of the axiomatization of the Harsanyi solution for NTU-games by Hart (1985) is shown to depend on the regularity conditions imposed on games. Following this observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric egalitarian solution (Kalai and Samet, 1985) and one of the consistent solution (Maschler and Owen, 1992). The three axiomatic results are studied, evaluated and compared in detail. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: C71; Nontransferable utility games; consistent solution; Harsanyi solution; symmetric egalitarain solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400193

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