The simple geometry of perfect information games

Stefano Demichelis (), Klaus Ritzberger and Jeroen Swinkels ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 3, 315-338

Abstract: Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Extensive form games; Perfect information; Subgame perfection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400169

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