The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games

Stefano Demichelis, Klaus Ritzberger and Jeroen Swinkels ()
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Stefano Demichelis: CORE

No 115, Economics Series from Institute for Advanced Studies

Abstract: Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.

Keywords: Perfect information; Subgame perfection; Equilibrium correspondence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://irihs.ihs.ac.at/id/eprint/2653 First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The simple geometry of perfect information games (2004)
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