Punishment strategies make the α-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced

Takuya Masuzawa ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 479-483

Abstract: We present a sufficient condition under which the α-coalitional game associated with a strategic form game is ordinally convex and balanced. The n-person prisoners’ dilemma games satisfy this condition. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: NTU games; the α-coalitional game; Ordinally convex game; Balanced game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:479-483

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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400171

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