Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof

John Hillas, Mathijs Jansen, Jos Potters and Dries Vermeulen

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 3, 377 pages

Abstract: Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS property. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Game Theory; Nash equilibrium; Stable sets; Admissibility of strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400168

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