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Network formation and anti-coordination games

Yann Bramoullé (), Dunia López-Pintado (), Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Dunia Lopez Pintado

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 33, issue 1, 1-19

Abstract: We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2×2 anti-coordination games – games where a player’s best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: networks; links; anti-coordination games; efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: NETWORK FORMATION AND ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES (2002) Downloads
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