NETWORK FORMATION AND ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES

Dunia López-Pintado (), Fernando Vega Redondo, Sanjeev Goyal and Yann Bramoullé
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Dunia López-Pintado: Universidad de Alicante
Fernando Vega Redondo: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Fernando Vega-Redondo and Dunia Lopez Pintado

Working Papers. Serie AD from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie)

Abstract: We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games -- games where a player's best response is to behave differently than the opponent. We characterize the nature of equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both the network architecture and the induced behavior are crucially dependent on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, the equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient. This conclusion continues to hold if the population game is embedded in a standard evolutionary model of learning, since all equilibria turn out to be stochastically stable.

Keywords: networks; links; anti-coordination games; efficiency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2002-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-2002-25.pdf Fisrt version / Primera version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Network formation and anti-coordination games (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2002-25

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