Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism

Marilda Sotomayor ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 32, issue 2, 251 pages

Keywords: stable matching; subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; direct mechanism; strong equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300156

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