Borel stay-in-a-set games

A. Maitra () and W. Sudderth ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 32, issue 1, 97-108

Abstract: Consider an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S, compact metric action sets A 1 ,A 2 ,…,A n , and law of motion q such that the integral under q of every bounded Borel measurable function depends measurably on the initial state x and continuously on the actions (a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a n ) of the players. If the payoff to each player i is 1 or 0 according to whether or not the stochastic process of states stays forever in a given Borel set G i , then there is an ε-equilibrium for every ε>0. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

Keywords: N-person stochastic games; Nash equilibrium; Borel sets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300148

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