Observation, Measurement, and Computation in Finite Games

Kislaya Prasad

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 455-470

Abstract: Limitations in agents’ ability to observe, measure and compute are studied. A formulation in terms of induced changes in the players’ subjective perception of the game makes it possible to study these phenomena on a common footing with objective variation in the game. We study a model where payoffs undergo continuous variation and players reason about the process from limited local information. Specifically, finite games, and statements about them, are interpreted within sheaf models, which incorporate both variation and a logic of limited observation. Nash’s theorem on the existence of equilibrium is not valid unless special observational properties hold, although closely related statements are valid. The possibility of learning to play a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium from observation of past play is also examined within the framework. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; variation; observation; measurement; computation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400163 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:455-470

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s001820400163

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().