A mean value for games with communication structures

Gerard Hamiache

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 533-544

Abstract: The mean value is a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure representable by a simple graph; only pairwise meetings can occur, although some of them might not be permitted. The new value is characterized by a set of axioms of which the one with the most far-reaching effect is an associated consistency property already used in various contexts. The mean value of an n-player unanimity game is the arithmetic average of the mean values of (n−1)-player unanimity games with connected support, which means games in which the deleted players are not articulation point of the considered graph. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: Shapley value; communication structure; associated game; consistency; graph (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: A Mean-Value for Games with Communication Structure (2000)
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400175

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