A Mean-Value for Games with Communication Structure

Gerard Hamiache

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: We present a new extension of the Shapley value for games with communication structure,only pairwise meetings can occur when some of them are not permitted.The present extension is a new one and in particular it is di .erent from the Myerson value,from the position value,and from a previous value proposed by the author.The motor of this new axiomatization is an associated consistency axiom which has already been used in various contexts.Following this new value,the payment received by a given player in a unanimity game is the arithmetic average of the payments that this player would have received in a selection of smaller unanimity games.

Keywords: COMMUNICATION; GAMES; GRAPHS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: A mean value for games with communication structures (2004)
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