Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games

Rodica Brânzei (), Tamás Solymosi and Stef Tijs ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2005, vol. 33, issue 3, 447-460

Keywords: cooperative game; nucleolus; computation; peer group game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Working Paper: Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games (2003)
Working Paper: Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games (2003)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-005-0213-9

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