Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games

R. Brânzei, Tamás Solymosi and S.H. Tijs
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R. Brânzei: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research
S.H. Tijs: Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research

No 2003-19, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: game theory; algorithm; cooperative games; kernel estimation; peer games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games (2005)
Working Paper: Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games (2003)
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